Cloud of Things (CoT) is increasingly viewed as a paradigm that can satisfy the diverse requirements of emerging Internet of Things (IoT) applications. The potential of CoT is not yet realized due to challenges in sharing and reusing IoT physical resources across multiple applications. The existing approaches provide small-scale and hardware-dependent shared access to IoT resources. This article considers using market mechanisms to commoditize CoT resources as the approach to enable shared access to CoT resources and to improve their reusability. In order to achieve this, the requirements for trading CoT resources are discussed to conceptualize the proposed approach. A generic description model for CoT resource is introduced to quantify the value of CoT resources. In this article, a marketplace architecture for trading CoT resources referred to as AMACoT is proposed. By formulating the trading of CoT resources as an optimization problem, the proposed approach is experimentally validated. The evaluation measures the system performance and verifies the optimization problem using three evolutionary algorithms. The evaluation of the optimization algorithms demonstrates the optimality of trading CoT resources solutions in terms of resource cost, resource utilization, provider lock-in, and provider profit.
Challenges in CoT resource management include load balancing, resource allocation, and scheduling [5] . The complexity of resource allocation in CoT comes from the following. The heterogeneity of IoT resources, the constrained capacities of IoT resources, the scalability of IoT systems, and the dynamism of IoT resources. These challenges lead to missing/limiting shared access to the IoT physical resources and consequently lessen the reusability of the resources across multiple applications. These also result in overprovisioned IoT infrastructure to meet the unpredictable application requirements in which resources may be significantly underutilized.
This article aims to improve shared access to CoT resources by proposing a marketplace architecture which can provide efficient resource allocation and deal with the complex issues present in the CoT. The solution reimagines CoT resources as commodities rather than as organizational assets. It considers the business model of a marketplace whereby consumers request access (lease) to providers' resources. A marketplace that potentially can automate the trading between the CoT resources and the CoT applications. The proposed approach is motivated as follows. The deployments of IoT remain costly despite the increasing demand for IoT applications, the reduction in software and hardware costs [6] . This makes IoT adoption infeasible to many prospective users and emerging applications. Commoditization of CoT enables the development of IoT applications independently from the infrastructure deployments. It also enables shared access to IoT physical resources. These likely lead to cost reduction in IoT resources and management as well as empowering new IoT applications and services.
There are various use cases for the CoT marketplace. For instance, an event management agency manages event facilities in a metropolitan area where it aims to improve its operational efficiency. The agency wants to develop an application that performs the following tasks. Find the least congested routes to an exhibition center leavers. Crowd monitoring of fans attending games in a nearby stadium for better incidents response. Waste monitoring to efficiently automate the waste collection after organized events if needed. Having a dedicated CoT infrastructure for this application may require a significant upfront investment. In the CoT marketplace, the agency would request a bundle of CoT resources to perform the tasks. For instance, footfall sensors and motion detection cameras around event facilities to guide people to the least congested tracks. The bundle may include sensors, actuators, cameras, and other resources. The application consumes the required resources for a specific time and then releases them back to the marketplace 2327-4662 c 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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when lease time elapses. In this case, the application utilizes the required resources without considerable investment nor dedicated infrastructure. Similarly, providers deploy their CoT resources without being tied up to particular applications. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The related work is reviewed in Section II. Section III describes the trading requirements of CoT resources followed by the description of the proposed marketplace architecture in Section IV. Section V analyzes the security threats to CoT marketplace architecture (AMACoT). The experimental setup and evaluation are presented in Section VI. Section VII concludes this article and describes the planned future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Market-based mechanisms for trading cloud and IoT resources are intensively studied. The cloud-based approaches are more mature than the ones dedicated to IoT that are still emerging. As CoT relies heavily on IoT resources, this section focuses on the IoT-related market-based mechanisms. It reviews the recent literature and categorizes them into one of the two categories described in the following sections.
A. IoT Marketplace Architectures
The concept of a marketplace for IoT-related resource is gaining prominence. A marketplace architecture for trading IoT data in real time is proposed in [7] . The architecture enables providers to offer their IoT data streams for consumption by IoT applications. The proposed work differs from others by implementing the architecture and addressing various aspects, including scalability and compatibility. A generic cloud-based marketplace architecture is proposed in [8] to enable the trading of IoT deployments. The architecture addresses the Cloud-IoT integration and vendor lock-in issues. A marketplace for IoT resources is introduced as part of the broader architecture of the IoT ecosystem in [9] . The trading model of IoT information and functions is presented as a solution to five IoT interoperability issues.
A different approach is taken by [10] to establish a decentralized marketplace for IoT data based on the blockchain technology. The proposed marketplace architecture uses simple contracts to simplify the trading of IoT data among participants. IDMoB is another decentralized marketplace for IoT data built on blockchain [11] . The marketplace enables trading of IoT data for none time-sensitive IoT applications. DataBroker DAO is another blockchain-based marketplace implemented to trade IoT data [12] . IoT generated data is traded using smart contracts among buyers and sellers via the Ethereum network.
A decentralized peer-to-peer marketplace for IoT data is presented in [13] . The proposed architecture differs from others by adopting the fog computing model and blockchain technology. IoT data are prepared (e.g., filtered and processed) at a fog nodes layer while traded directly among the marketplace participants at the application layer. Another decentralized architecture is designed in [14] with the focus of IoT traffic metering and contract compliance. The presented system aims to improve transparency, fairness, and interoperability while reducing the cost. The study also conceptualizes a tracking model for the traded IoT data flows between IoT and cloud computing.
B. IoT Trading Mechanisms
Several market-based approaches are depicted and discussed in [15] . The study also proposes a game-theory-based model to study the pricing of two IoT sensing services. Another set of market-based mechanisms is studied in [16] . This includes an analysis of IoT marketplace incentives, service patterns, information timeliness, and social impacts. Two bidding algorithms to support IoT resource trading are introduced in [17] . The first algorithm aims to maximize the provider's revenue while the second algorithm is to lock the highest bid in the recurrent auction. Both algorithms are intended to protect the marketplace from collapse in certain trading scenarios. A semantic matching model for the IoT marketplace is presented in [18] . The model facilitates the matching process between providers' offerings and consumers' queries in a marketplace of the BIG IoT project [19] . A composition mechanism for IoT offerings is presented in [20] . The approach is based on a Web-semantic model to describe IoT things and services for trading.
A feedback mechanism is proposed in [21] to support IoT data marketplaces. The blockchain-based approach enables consumers to rate the providers who have to maintain and improve their reputation based on feedback received. A marketplace model is also proposed in [22] to support the quality of trading. It introduces a credibility rating mechanism for providers based on the quality of their data. Another IoT marketplace model based on the Stackelberg game is presented in [23] to model the trading processes in IoT environments. The model aims to minimize the complexities for IoT consumers while trading with IoT providers.
To support automation in IoT trading, a blockchain-based automated payment system is proposed in [24] . The system uses Ethereum contracts to automate payments without a need to intermediaries. An architecture is presented in [25] to support service-level agreements (SLAs) while trading IoT data. The architecture uses three criteria model to improve satisfaction, payment, and SLA. The security mechanisms for protecting the IoT data marketplace are studied in [26] . The study also proposes the authentication and authorization model to control access to the traded resources.
C. Gap Analysis
The related work presented above shows it is merely focused on commoditizing IoT data sets/streams but not on the IoT physical devices. Further limitations of the existing work are surveyed in [27] . This includes limited IoT resources integration, resource sharing, and interoperability. Further limitations of existing shared access to IoT resources revolve around small-scale and hardware-specific support mechanisms [6] , [28] . Our approach fills that gap by proposing a generic description model for CoT resources and a scalable architecture for trading them. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first dedicated to trading CoT resources.
III. TRADING COT RESOURCES
Trading CoT resources is a multifaceted process. It involves mapping resources to applications, optimizing the proposed maps, performing resource allocation, and scheduling of the optimal map. To shape this approach, the following considerations are taken into account.
1) CoT resources and applications are heterogeneous. To decompose this complexity and improve interoperability, resource deployment and application development are considered distinct from each other. This lowers the investment required for infrastructure deployments, accelerates application prototyping, and enables efficient trading. 2) CoT systems are large scale and their commoditization mechanisms, therefore, have to be scalable. In particular, having the ability to handle significant large numbers of resources and application requests simultaneously. 3) CoT resources are naturally constrained in terms of computing and power capabilities. Due to such challenge, concurrent shared access to those resources may not be possible but has to be resolved. Based on the above-mentioned considerations, the following requirements of the proposed approach are identified.
A. Marketplace System
The CoT marketplace concept is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The idea is to have a marketplace-denoted by M-where providers offer their deployed CoT resources and applications request access to the offered resources. The marketplace matches requests to resources by forming a bundle of resources from multiple providers based on the application requirements. More details about the marketplace architecture are provided in Section IV. Table II provides the trading vocabularies used with their description.
B. Marketplace Participants
The marketplace consists of two categories of participants, namely, providers and consumers. Providers are CoT infrastructure owners/deployers and are denoted by P = (p 1 , . . . , p m ). p m represents an individual, an organization, or a broker who manages the resources on behalf of others. P submits their resources R = (r 1 , . . . , r j ) to M.
Consumers are application owners/developers and are set to C = (c 1 , . . . , c n ). c n represents an individual, an organization, or a broker who manages the applications on behalf of others. C submits the requests RQ = (rq 1 , . . . , rq i ) to M for their CoT applications A = (a 1 , . . . , a z ) to access and utilize a set of R. 
C. Multiattribute Description Model for CoT Resource
The heterogeneity of CoT resources poses a challenge in defining and describing what a resource is? How can a wide range of heterogeneous resources be described generically? How can the value of CoT resources be quantified to enable monetizing them? The solution to these challenges is to propose a description model to: 1) define CoT resource; 2) provide a generic description of their properties; and 3) quantify the resources based on their described properties. The model is described as follows.
CoT resources can be defined generically based on their main physical components and functionalities. A CoT resource/node/device/thing is defined as a device with one or more basic computing functionalities (I/O, processing, and storage) that interacts with its surrounding [using sensor(s), camera(s), and actuator(s)] and communicates with other entities of a network [using communication unit(s)].
The model uses a multiattribute description of the resources based on their physical and functional properties. Each resource r j has a set of attributes RA = (ra 1 , . . . , ra t ) that contributes to its monetary value when traded as a commodity. This includes multiattributes of physical components (e.g., processing, actuating, sensing, and power) and nonphysical functions or features (e.g., security, location, and redundancy). Each property or feature can be expanded into a multilevel subattributes to improve the presence of the commodity resource in the marketplace. A snapshot of a single resource description is provided in Table I .
The value of the multiattributes presented in the previous step can be quantified by assigning corresponding numerical values. This is a vital step to monetize heterogeneous resources generically and to enable them to be traded. This can be achieved by assigning lower numerical values to attributes representing low resource specification and vice versa. Zero is a corresponding value for a missing resource component while a positive number corresponds to an attribute. This can be formulated as follows: ra = > 0, if ra j can be described from r j 0, otherwise.
For instance, a power capacity attribute of r j can be quantified as either [Power = [Permanent, 2]] or [Power = [Battery, 1] ]. In this case, a resource with permanent power supply is assigned a higher value than the one operates by a battery and is likely to have a better monetary value when commoditized. This offers the flexibility required in quantifying the value of heterogeneous CoT resources before the trading process starts.
D. Optimization Model
After CoT resources being described and their value quantified, resources can be matched with the application requests. This article takes a unique approach to perform the matching by using the gradient-free optimization algorithms as a mapper for resources/requests. Using this type of optimization algorithms (also known as derivative-free algorithms) is justified as follows. This type of optimization does not require the calculation of the gradient or derivative to find the optimal solution. The computation of the gradient can be impractical or computationally costly for large-scale optimization problems such as trading CoT resources. This approach provides the following advantages that justify the use of optimization algorithms.
1) Using optimization algorithms provides improved architectural flexibility over a specially designed component (e.g., auctioneer and mapper). This means there is minimal or no need to change the optimization algorithm to support any changes in other marketplace system components or CoT resources/requests. 2) Optimization algorithms are known to find optimal solutions to NP-hard problems similar in complexity and scalability to the trading CoT resources problem presented in this article.
3) The speed of many optimization algorithms meets well with the requirements of the CoT marketplace in trading CoT resources promptly. The optimization model is presented in Fig. 2 and described as follows. The optimizer receives resources from the providers and requests from the consuming applications. Both resources and requests are filtered to generate a potential map of matched resources to requests. Once the map is formed, the optimizer evaluates the map by minimizing or maximizing one or more trading objectives to find the most optimal set of requests matched to resources. The evaluation process continues till either the maximum number of iterations reached or specific criteria met (e.g., time elapsed, no improvement in finding optimal solutions for many iterations). Further description of the optimization model is presented in Section IV.
E. Trading Objectives
Trading objectives represent the goals of providers P and consumers C from participating in trading CoT resources. These goals are formulated as objective functions to provide significant flexibility for the trading model. Using this approach minimizes the redevelopment effort of the system components that may be required in case of resource changes. Changes can be implemented as a new objective function without or with minimal changes in the system side. The trading of CoT resources is presented as a multiobjective optimization problem as follows:
where i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , m for constraints (6)- (10) . The descriptions of the objectives and constraints are provided as follows.
Objective 1: Minimizing the resource cost is one of the usual motivations of the consumers. Consumers are likely to bid for minimal cost resources. The cost objective function is presented in (2) . The following contributors to the total cost CS are considered when minimizing the cost of requested resources. Let b i be the bid from a consumer and cs j the provider's cost. The initial cost rc j can be calculated as rc j = (b i − cs j ). The requested utilization time of a resource is set to t i while tq ij denotes the estimated transmission and delay time. Provider reputation rp j is set based on the credibility measures of the marketplace to determine the trustworthiness of the provider. The reputation is assumed as part of the resource cost for two reasons.
1) It enables the marketplace to use any feedback mechanism that allows consumers to rate their providers' trustworthiness.
2) The reputation of the provider has an indirect effect on the cost of resources. A provider with a higher reputation is enabled to offer its resources with better cost than a low-rated provider. Objective 2: CoT applications are assumed to monopolize access to a set of resources for a given time [29] . This can cause low utilization of the allocated resources due to the light requirements of some applications. For trading CoT resources to be efficient, resource utilization has to be optimized. Resource utilization objective function is presented in (3) . The objective considers the requested resource utilization time pu i , the available resource components ac j , and the actually utilized components of a resource uc i .
Objective 3: Function (4) presents the objective of minimizing provider lock-in. Vendor lock-in is a common challenge for commoditized computing services. It describes the situation where the consumers cannot migrate their data or applications to different providers due to various reasons. This objective aims to minimize the lock-in by considering the provider policy py j that enables the consumers to migrate and the proprietary technologies of the provider pt j . Both factors are rated from 1-5, where 1 is the most flexible policy toward consumer migration and lowest proprietary technologies that may hinder consumers from migrating to different providers.
Objective 4: Providers always aim to maximize their profit PR. Equation (5) presents the profit objective function. This can be achieved by maximizing the cost of resources rc j and their utilization time t i while considering the marketplace charges mc j as expenses.
In addition to the objectives, the constraints are used to identify feasible solutions to the resource trading problem. This significantly minimizes the search space of such scalable and complex set of candidate solutions. Constraint (6) illustrates that costs and bids have to be positive, and bids are always greater than or equal resource costs. The energy constraint presented in (7) ensures the required energy Er i to perform application tasks does not exceed the available resource energy Ep j . Constraint (8) specifies the security requirements of the application se i to be satisfied by the security capabilities of the resource se j . Constraint (9) provides credibility insurance to the marketplace participants based on their performance. Providers have to maintain a certain reputation level rp j in the marketplace while consumers specify their providers' credibility requirements rp i . Constraint (10) enables participants to specify participant-specific requirements or limitations in responding to some applications or resources attributes. This constraint is part of this approach genuineness and flexibility to handle heterogeneous CoT resources and applications.
F. Other Requirements
Other requirements of the marketplace can be implemented based on its design and operational goals. This article justifies those requirements as follows.
Scalability: A marketplace for CoT resources is expected to handle a considerable number of consumer requests and provider resources simultaneously. This can impact system performance and consequently fail to trade CoT resources. The marketplace system should have the ability to handle various scales of consumer requests and provider resources.
Security: Security is vital for any marketplace architecture. Security analysis is performed in Section V to address the potential security threats to the proposed system.
Multiple Business Models: To satisfy the requirements of different CoT applications, the marketplace should support different business models. This includes consumer-to-consumer, provider-to-consumer, and provider-to-provider. It may also consider implementing the system to support one or more of the following market structures: broker system, monopoly market, oligopoly market, single-side auction, and double-side auction.
Multiple Participant Objectives: Marketplace participants have different requirements/goals. For instance, consumers are likely to bid for the lowest cost possible while providers aim to maximize their revenues. Consumers may have conflicting objectives at the same time (e.g., maximizing resource coverage while minimizing the response time). The marketplace system should provide a mechanism to maintain the balance among conflict objectives.
IV. MARKETPLACE ARCHITECTURE
The proposed marketplace architecture is illustrated in Fig. 3 . The architecture is structured into four functional layers as follows. The submission layer represents the marketplace entry point where the participants are authenticated and granted authorized access to trade.
The mapping layer consists of resource and request managers. The resource manager provides interfaces that enable resource providers to submit, update, and remove their resource specifications. Resources are described and quantified based on the description model discussed in Section III-C. Resource descriptions include connectivity options and resources are assumed to be connected already to the Internet via IoT gateways. Similarly, the request manager's interfaces receive application requirements from consumers. Application requirements are high-level descriptions of the computing and budget needs as illustrated in Table III . Consumers can also update and remove their applications using the request manager. Mapping libraries of both resource and request managers provide early local coordination to turn resource specifications and application requirements into bids.
The optimization layer represents the operational tier of the system. Applications can discover resources that are already stored in the resource manager. Bids flow from resource and request managers to multiplexers where they are selected to form bundles. Resource bundles represent a set of resources from multiple providers that can potentially be utilized by multiple applications. While being forwarded to the optimizer, resource bundles and application requests are filtered. Pluggable filters include a wide range of filtering criteria, such as location, resource coverage, computing, and energy requirements. Filtered resource bundles and application requests are forwarded to the optimizer. The optimizer performs a twostage process as follows: 1) construct optimal maps that consist of resource bundles and application requests ready for allocation and 2) evaluate the optimal maps based on the participants' goals using utility functions presented in Section III-E. One optimal map is forwarded to the resource allocation manager for resources to be allocated to the applications.
The allocation layer consists mainly of the resource allocation manager. The scheduler manages the utilization time of the resources based on the application requirements. It also coordinates with the allocator to enable resources joining the application network and disjoining when the lease time elapses. The monitor captures resource allocation events in real time and provides interfaces where consumers and providers oversee their transactions.
V. THREAT ANALYSIS The marketplace system should enforce different security measures to secure its operations. Security threats are analyzed using the STRIDE model [1] to help the design of the architecture by identifying potential threats. The STRIDE model is used due to its maturity among other threat modeling techniques and due to its simplicity. Table IV illustrates the STRIDE threats, security propriety violated, and the impacted layers of the proposed architecture.
As Table IV shows, each layer of AMACoT components may be impacted by one or more types of threats. At the submission layer, an attacker can illegally gain access and use a consumer's or a provider's credentials to access the marketplace. AMACoT can mitigate this threat by using authentication protocols that do not require a password or use signed certificates to verify the authenticity of consumers/providers. The attacker can also tamper at the submission layer by maliciously modify a consumer's request or a provider's offerings. These types of threats may occur using bit-flipping or injection attacks. AMACoT can mitigate these attacks by integrating adequate users' input/output validation tools for proper data integrity validation. The submission layer is also susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks where the attacker aims to interrupt the marketplace making it unavailable or unstable to providers/consumers. This can occur when the system is flooded with a large number of concurrent requests. The security manager can alleviate DoS attacks by employing requests/offers limiter to maintain the number of submissions at an acceptable level. The mapping layer can be vulnerable to the threats of information disclosure and elevation of privileges. Information disclosure threats the confidentiality of marketplace users when the attacker maliciously gets hold of the users' sensitive data stored in the resource manager and/or the request manager. AMACoT can use a common practice to mitigate this threat by encrypting the users' sensitive data. Elevation of privileges also poses a considerable risk at the mapping layer. An attacker can attempt to gain some privileges that enable him to perform some actions that he cannot achieve. This may include manipulating bids at either resource or requests manager or both. The system should implement robust authorization techniques and operate the components at the mapping layer using nonroot users. The optimization layer can also be vulnerable to both threats, in addition to the DoS attacks. AMACoT can prevent such attacks using the same mitigating mechanisms discussed earlier for the submission and mapping layers.
The resource allocation manager is vulnerable to data tampering. This may occur when a user tries to manipulate a schedule before resources are allocated to take advantage of other users. Mitigation may include validating users' input/output to detect and prevent data tampering.
Although the security aspects are crucial to the marketplace architecture, the focus of this article is on demonstrating the feasibility and performance of AMACoT in CoT resource allocation using optimization algorithms. For deployment of this architecture if it is important to take security as the aim of the study. It would be necessary to take standard IoT security precautions such as those identified in [36] . Those precautions and any deployment of specific security mechanisms, therefore, fall out of this article's scope.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section presents the experimental evaluation of the proposed work. After the experimental setup explanation in Section VI-A, Section VI-B provides system verification aiming to evaluate the system footprint, and Section VI-C presents the algorithmic evaluation of the proposed approach using different optimization algorithms.
A. Experimental Setup
The architecture is developed using Python in a computer with 2.3-GHz Xeon processor, a 125-GB memory, and Linux OS. In order to simulate the behavior of distributed systems, Python Remote Object (Pyro4) is used to connect the main components of the system as well as consumers and providers.
The optimization engine of AMACoT integrates the optimization algorithms to map requests to resources and to evaluate the optimal resource allocation. The following optimization algorithms are implemented as follows.
NSGAII: Nondominated sorting genetic algorithm II [30] is an improved genetic algorithm that is widely used in realworld multiobjective optimization applications. The population size is set to 200 with a maximum number of 200 iterations for all experiments.
NSGAIII: This algorithm is an extension of the NSGAII that uses reference points to diversify the Pareto points during the search [31] . Besides the same settings used for NSGAII, the number of divisions is set to 12.
SPEA2: Strength Pareto evolutionary algorithm 2 [32] is designed and used to optimize combinatorial problems. The population size is set to 200 with a maximum number of 200 iterations for all experiments.
B. Implementation Verification
Stress tests are performed to evaluate the footprint of the system components when they interact with each other as well as interacting with providers and consumers. Three experiments are performed using three different scale factors as shown in Table V . The scale factors aim to evaluate the scalability of the AMACoT system and measure the overheads generated. In these three experiments, the SPEA2 algorithm is used to minimize the resource cost while maximizing the provider profit. This evaluation measures the following system footprints: 1) CPU usage; 2) memory usage; 3) latency that is measured from the time of request submission to the time of resource allocation confirmation; and 4) throughput to measure the number of requests/resources handled by AMACoT over the trading time. memory, and 119 s to produce an optimal resource allocation. The maximum throughput of this experiment is 168 requests and 3361 resources per second. Experiment 3: 30 000 requests and 600 000 resources are submitted to AMACoT by 300 consumers and 300 providers, respectively. The peak CPU load of Experiment 3 is 13% while 11 GB of memory used. Producing an optimal resource allocation requires 185 s for Experiment 3. AMACoT processed 162 requests and 3243 resources per second.
The results of the verification tests are summarized in Table VI . Results show that CPU usage increases from 10% in Experiment 1 to 11% in Experiment 2 when Experiment 2 scales up by 100%. The CPU load also increases from 11% in Experiment 2 to 13% in Experiment 3 that scales up by 100%. This implies a reasonable CPU usage when marketplace participants increase significantly. Memory usage is also measured for the three experiments as follows. Experiment 1 requires 3 GB of memory, 7 GB for Experiment 2, and 11 GB for Experiment 3. Memory consumption increases from 3 GB in Experiment 1 to 7 GB in Experiment 2 when the marketplace participants rise by 100%. In Experiment 3, the memory consumption increases up to 11 GB when the experiment scales up by further 100%. Results indicate a fair memory usage across the three experiments when different scale factors are considered.
Latency relies significantly on three aspects as follows: 1) the optimization algorithm used; 2) the complexity of optimized objectives; and 3) the number of optimized objectives. The latency results presented are obtained from the SPEA2 algorithm optimizing two objectives. The latency of Experiment 2 is about two times the latency of Experiment 1 while the latency of Experiment 3 is about 1.5 times the latency of Experiment 2. This implies that the latency is doubled as the experiment scales up by 100%. The throughput results show that request throughput decreases 4% only when the marketplace participants rise by 100% in Experiment 2 from Experiment 1. The request throughput declines 3.5% further in Experiment 3 when compared to Experiment 2. The resource throughput in Experiment 2 shows 4% reduction in comparison to Experiment 1 while it decreases 3.5% in Experiment 3 when compared to Experiment 2. The overall evaluation of throughput shows sensible throughput variations across the three experiments.
C. Algorithmic Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of the optimization algorithms used and the quality of their optimal solutions, a set of ten experiments is performed using the same scale factor of Experiment 3. The following experiments optimize a single objective and compare the results of the three algorithms used. 
Experiment 4:
This experiment minimizes the resource cost as presented in (2) . Fig. 4 shows the comparative evaluation results for resource cost optimality. All algorithms compete toward optimal solutions but NSGAIII and SPEA2 find better cost than NSGAII.
Experiment 5: This aims to minimize the possibility of provider lock-in as presented in (4) . Fig. 5 illustrates that NSGAII and NSGAIII algorithms converged into an optimal solution that is approximately 24% lower than the solution of SPEA2.
Experiment 6: This experiment is intended to maximize the provider profit as described in (5) . Fig. 6 demonstrates the competition between NSGAII and SPEA2 in which both algorithms take approximately the same direction to the optimal profit. In contrast, NSGAIII improves its solutions significantly during early iterations and maintain steady improvements toward the last iteration. NSGAII and NSGAIII provide slightly better profit for providers than SPEA2. Experiment 7: Resource optimization is performed in this experiment to maximize the resource utilization by consumers as presented in (3). Fig. 7 illustrates NSGAII outperforms other algorithms in maximizing the resource utilization. In contrast to the other algorithms, NSGAIII shows insignificant changes throughout the process. Experiments 4-7 perform the standard optimization of a single objective that may not be practical for many real-world CoT applications. CoT applications often involve multiple objectives and therefore require multiobjective optimization to find optimal solutions for two or more objectives including conflicting ones (e.g., min. resource cost while max. resource utilization). This conflict is commonly addressed by using the Pareto approach [33] to evaluate a set of tradeoff solutions.
The following experiments show the progression of optimizing multiple objectives using different approaches. Experiment 8: This experiment optimizes the resource cost and provider profit as presented in (2) and (5), respectively. A way of performing this is to aggregate both objectives into a single one using weight factors as follows:
subject to (6)- (10) 
where w 1 and w 2 are the weights for resource cost and provider profit, respectively. Weighting factors are used to prioritize objectives. To maintain the balance between the two objectives, the value of w 1 and w 2 is equally set to 0.5, where w 1 + w 2 = 1. Fig. 8 shows that NSGAII and SPEA2 outperform NSGAIII despite the lower start of NSGAIII. Prioritizing objectives for CoT applications is challenging for the following reasons. First, it requires prior knowledge of the problem to assign appropriate weights. This prior knowledge may not always be available to CoT applications. Second, optimization objectives are application specific and therefore need reprioritization more frequently using weighting factors. Third, this approach yields one optimal solution only. This gives the decision maker no other solutions to the problem. Although this method may benefit specific applications with prior knowledge about the problem, the following experiments consider using the Pareto approach [33] to evaluate a set of optimal solutions rather than one solution only. Experiments 9-12 evaluate conflicting biobjectives that reflect real-world business requirements. Using the Pareto approach produces a set of optimal solutions for both objectives where an optimal solution of an objective does not worsen the solution of the other objective. Using this approach aims to maintain the balance among conflicting objectives of consumers and providers.
The challenge is how to measure the quality of Paretogenerated solutions of different optimization algorithms. To overcome this shortcoming, each set of optimal solutions produced in the following experiments is evaluated using the hypervolume indicator (HV) [34] . HV measures the size of the covered space by the generated set of Pareto solutions. A higher value of HV indicates the better distribution of the Pareto solutions and approximately closer to the optimality.
Experiment 9: This experiment optimizes the resource cost and provider profit as presented in (2) and (5), respectively. Fig. 9 shows there is an insignificant difference among the optimal solutions of the three algorithms. The HV values of NSGAII, NSGAIII, and SPEA2 are 0.57, 0.56, and 0.62, respectively. This implies that SPEA2 generates slightly better optimal solutions for minimizing the resource cost and maximizing the provider profit.
Experiment 10: Another business requirement for CoT applications is to optimize resource cost and resource utilization benefiting the resource consumers. Experiment 10 is intended to minimize the resource cost and maximize the resource utilization as described in (2) and (3), respectively. As illustrated in Fig. 10 , all algorithms provide multiple solutions that maintain the balance between minimizing the cost and maximizing the resource utilization. It can also be noted that the resource cost increases as the resource utilization increases. This implies there is a tradeoff between the resource cost and utilization as resource providers may enable higher resource utilization with higher cost. Fig. 14 shows an overall high HV indicator for the three algorithms with slight differences among them.
Experiment 11: This experiment optimizes the provider profit and provider lock-in as presented in (5) and (4), respectively. It aims to benefit both providers and consumers by maximizing the provider profit while minimizing the chance of consumers being locked in one or very few providers' infrastructures. Fig. 11 shows that NSGAII and SPEA2 provide numbers of solutions that are approximately twice as NSGAIII does. NSGAIII, however, generates a similar distribution of the Pareto-generated solutions. Fig. 11(a) and (c), respectively, illustrates that NSGAII and SPEA2 find over 50% of the solutions with provider lock-in rate of 40% or more. This may indicate providers' preference of locking consumers to maximize the profit. Fig. 14 (3) and (4) . Fig. 12 shows that all algorithms produce over 60% over their solutions with provider lock-in rate of 30% or more. This may imply that resources with high utilization rates are associated with high chances of provider lock-in. Fig. 14 illustrates that all algorithms attain similar HV values. This suggests a similar performance of the algorithms in finding the optimality of resource utilization and provider lock-in utility.
Experiment 13: This experiment aims to optimize resource cost, resource utilization, provider lock-in, and provider profit and as described in (2)- (5) . It explores the potential optimality of multiple conflicting objectives as well as the performance of the optimization algorithms. Visualizing the Pareto fronts of large-dimensional multiobjective optimization problems is known to be a challenge [35] . One of the ways to visualize the results of this experiment is to use the scatter plot matrix as illustrated in Fig. 13 .
In this experiment, the Pareto fronts can be identified as shown in Fig. 13(d )-(f). Fig. 13(a) -(c) shows the solutions scattered across the solution space while the Pareto fronts are not typically formed yet. This can be clearly seen in Fig. 13(b) as a typical front should be formed toward the left side of both axes when both objectives are minimized. This may imply the following: 1) generating the Pareto optimal solutions is possible in the case of a high-dimensional optimization problem and 2) the optimizer parameters may need to be improved to address the increase in the number of objectives. The number of iterations and the population size have not been changed in this experiment to be consistent with other experiments performed with the same parameters.
The experiments presented in this section demonstrate the progression of optimizing various objectives. Experiments 4-7 optimize single objective, Experiment 8 optimizes multiple objectives using the weighted sum method while Experiments 9-12 optimize multiple objectives using the Pareto approach. Experiment 13 optimizes all functions presented earlier using the Pareto approach. Experiments 4-8 generate one optimal solution each while Experiments 9-13 provide a set of optimal solutions each. The evaluation of experiments' results using the HV indicator suggests the following. Experiment 8 (weighted sum approach) produces the lowest HV score. This is likely because the approach produces one optimal solution only that cannot contribute to the volume calculation. In Experiments 9-13, the HV values indicate that NSGAII performs better than the other algorithms on three experiments while SPEA2 outperforms others on two experiments.
D. Discussion
The performance results presented in Section VI-B show reasonable system overheads and demonstrate good scalability. AMACoT incurs insignificant CPU and memory overheads when marketplace participants are doubled in Experiment 2 and tripled in Experiment 3. AMACoT also maintains a good level of throughput with a minimal reduction below 5% across all the three experiments. The overall stress results imply the advantage of reducing the architectural complexity in CoT by using an optimization algorithm as the core of the trading manager rather than a specific-purpose system component.
Latency becomes a limitation for AMACoT performance with respect to scalability. The latency increases by approximately twofold when resources and requests are doubled. This may imply the dependency of optimization algorithms on the hardware setup. Performing the same experiments in higher hardware specifications may reduce the latency of the system significantly. Running the optimizer on multiprocessing setup can also provide further improvement to the system latency.
The evaluation of optimization algorithms presented in Section VI-C provides the comparative results of the algorithm's performance and the optimality of their solutions. The evaluation validates the use of objective functions in quantifying the value of CoT resources. This implies the heterogeneity of CoT resources and the dynamic requirements of CoT consumers can be formulated as objective functions that are likely to be optimized. It can be concluded that using optimizationbased approaches as market mechanisms for CoT resource is feasible and promising.
VII. CONCLUSION This article proposes a trading approach for CoT resources consisting of a multiattribute description model for CoT resources, the trading objectives, and the marketplace architecture. In contrast to other approaches, the proposed approach separates between CoT application development and hardware deployment considering CoT resources as commodities. Experimental evaluation validates the system and algorithmic performance. AMACoT generates optimal solutions using the single optimization, weighted sum, and Pareto fronts approaches. The optimality of resource cost, provider lockin, resource utilization, and provider profit is evaluated. The HV indicator is used to measure the performance of the optimization algorithms and the quality of the optimal solutions they produced.
In order to address the limitations of this article, the following future work is planned. The adaptivity requirements of trading CoT resources will be investigated. Improving the system latency by potentially performing the optimization on multiprocessor setup and exploring further trading objectives to address more consumer and provider requirements (e.g., QoS attributes).
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